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Abstract
Background: The history of governmental responses to the accumulation of scientific evidence
about the harms of secondhand smoke (SHS) presents an intriguing case study of incremental public
health policy development. Australia has long been considered a world-leader in progressive
tobacco control policies, but in the last decade has fallen behind other jurisdictions in introducing
SHS legislation that protects all workers. Bars, clubs and pubs remain the only public indoor spaces
where smoking is legally permitted, despite SHS exposure in the hospitality industry being higher
and affecting more people than in any other setting after domestic exposure. This paper examines
the political dynamics that have shaped this incremental approach to SHS.
Methods: In-depth interviews with 21 key stakeholders in the state of New South Wales (NSW),
including politicians, their advisors, health officials and tobacco control advocates, were conducted
and subjected to thematic content analysis. Interviewees' comments provided insights into the
dynamics surrounding the debates and outcomes of SHS legislative attempts and the current
political environment, and about how to progress SHS legislation.
Results: SHS restrictions have been delayed by several broad factors: the influence of industry
groups successfully opposing regulation; issue wear-out; and political perceptions that there is not
a salient constituency demanding that smoking be banned in bars and clubs. Interviewees also
provided suggestions of strategies that advocates might utilise to best overcome the current
political inertia of incremental compromises and achieve timely comprehensive smoking bans.
Conclusion: Advocates concerned to shorten the duration of incremental endgames must
continue to insist that governments address SHS fundamentally as a health issue rather than making
political concessions to industry groups, and should broaden and amplify community voices calling
on governments to finish the job. Publicity to the growing number of state and national
governments that have successfully implemented total bans over the past decade is likely to make
incrementalism an increasingly unattractive political option.
Background
The history of government response to the emerging evi-
dence on the harmfulness of secondhand smoke (SHS)
typically presents intriguing case studies of incremental
public health policy, often spanning decades. By incre-
mental, we mean a process whereby governments gradu-
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settings rather than acting to simultaneously introduce
smokefree requirements in all enclosed public places
where a duty-of-care toward employees, patrons or the
visiting public can be demonstrated to exist. Incremental
policy acknowledges that SHS should be controlled
because of its health consequences, but effectively gives
priority to protecting workers and citizens in certain con-
texts while permitting exposure to continue in others. The
most usual pattern features the introduction of smokefree
public transport, followed by office and indoor workplace
restrictions, then smokefree restaurants and finally bars
(pubs, taverns) and gambling venues. Incremental policy
is not predicated on arguments that exposure in the areas
of priority implementation is more severe or affects more
people and is thus deserving of more immediate control
than in the later regulated areas. Indeed, exposures in bars
are among the highest recorded [1]. Instead, other cul-
tural, economic and ideological factors are publicly
invoked by policy makers and legislators to justify the
delays [2].
SHS policy, while typically implemented by health
authorities, is thus not "rolled out" according to rational
risk reduction priorities, but as a form of regulatory para-
dox where those least severely exposed are the first to be
protected, while those most exposed (bar and gambling
venue workers) are the last. This incrementalism has been
ridiculed as "half pregnant" policy [3] reflecting neo-Dick-
ensian occupational health values whereby bar and casino
staff are denied legal protections that are enshrined in law
for all other indoor workers, restaurant staff and patrons,
the relatively transient passengers of public transport and
even elevator passengers.
In this paper we examine the recent history of incremental
legislation to introduce smoke-free indoor environments
in the most populous Australian state of New South Wales
(NSW). Australia has one of the world's most advanced
tobacco control programs [4,5] and has seen smoking
prevalence fall lower than any other comparable nation,
with daily smoking in those aged 14 and over now being
17.4% nationally, and 16.5% in NSW [6]. In Australia,
legislative and regulatory power to control smoking in
workplaces, public places and on public transport lies
with the six state and two territory governments. The fed-
eral (national) government can control smoking only on
federally controlled areas, such as airports and airlines.
Almost all public policy debates on SHS have therefore
occurred at the state level. A comprehensive outline of
NSW and Australian SHS policies can be found in our
detailed report [7].
In NSW, restrictions on smoking were first introduced on
public transport in 1976 because of concerns about pas-
senger comfort, and in cinemas and public halls in 1977
because of concerns about fire hazards (see Table 1). Pub-
lic debate and policy change premised on SHS being a
health risk to non-smokers did not commence until the
1980s.
The 1981 publication of Hirayama's Japanese study [8] on
lung cancer in non-smoking wives of smokers caused a
watershed in public policy about public tobacco use. Its
publication saw a rapid escalation in scientific attention
to the potential dangers of exposure to SHS. Australia's
peak health and medical advisory body, the National
Health and Medical Research Council, was one of the first
of its kind in 1986 to review the accumulating evidence
and recommend controls on smoking [9]. By 1987, pas-
sive smoking had become the leading topic receiving news
coverage in all reportage on smoking matters [10], and
remains so today [11].
Landmark events and reports generating widespread news
coverage in the past two decades included legal actions
brought by workers exposed to SHS, a successful but pro-
tracted court case brought against the Tobacco Institute of
Australia for publishing a misleading statement about
SHS [12] and debate surrounding attempts to introduce
smokefree workplaces and bans on smoking on airlines.
After several failed legislative attempts (via private mem-
bers' bills) to ban smoking in public places and work-
places in the early and mid-1990s, the NSW government
passed the Smokefree Environment Act 2000, in time for the
Sydney Olympics, banning smoking in enclosed public
spaces, including restaurants and the dining areas of pubs
and clubs. This law met little resistance, and was popular
with the public [13].
Since at least 2001, NSW senior politicians have been
quoted as saying that smoking bans in all workplaces are
"inevitable" [14]. However, unlike the recent responses of
the Irish, Norwegian, British and New Zealand govern-
ments to ban smoking in all public places, the NSW gov-
ernment has not responded to this "inevitability" with
timely and comprehensive legislation; it instead contin-
ues to effectively exempt bars and clubs from a total ban.
In early 2005, a final date for a complete indoor smoking
ban in bars and licensed clubs was set for adoption in July
2007, although intense lobbying from the hospitality
industry resulted in the government adopting a definition
of an "enclosed space" that will allow smoking in areas
that are up to 75% enclosed [15].
The pattern of bars being the "last bastion" to be
addressed in smokefree air legislation appears to have no
exceptions anywhere in the world where smokefree legis-
lation has been introduced. The protracted paradox ofPage 2 of 12
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with interest in how the hospitality industry – often with
backing from the tobacco industry [16] – has succeeded in
resisting smoke bans in spite of the risks posed particu-
larly to its staff, makes this a compelling subject for study.
With each year that bars avoid smokefree legislation, fur-
ther evidence accumulates about indoor air quality in bars
[17], bar workers' SHS exposure [1,18] and their
improved respiratory health when their workplaces go
smokefree [19]. Similarly, as the community's experience
Table 1: Timeline of NSW government responses to secondhand smoke (SHS)
Year Actions Notes
1970s Smoking banned on NSW buses and suburban 
trains, and in cinemas, theatres and public halls.
Smoking banned for comfort reasons.
1983 NSW Occupational Safety and Health Act 1983 Law obligates all employers to ensure that their employees are not exposed to health or 
safety risks at work. Smoking not specified in Act.
First NSW Parliamentary motion to ban 
smoking in workplaces and public places 
introduced as a private members' bill.
Parliament adjourned without addressing the motion.
1992 Smoking banned on NSW intercity trains Smoking banned for comfort reasons.
Scholem vs NSW Department of Health decided NSW court handed down the world's first jury verdict on an employer's negligence in 
regard to passive smoking.
1993 Occupational Health and Safety (Smoke-Free 
Indoor Air) Amendment Bill proposed as a private 
members' bill
The Bill sought to amend the 1983 Occupational Health and Safety Act to include explicit 
statements to ban smoking in all indoor workplaces, including bars and restaurants, and 
included a 12 month phase-in period. The AHA lobbied extensively against the bill and it 
was not supported by government.
NSW Parliament House Smoke-Free Environment 
Act passed
The Act banned smoking in the NSW Parliament House, but was ignored by some 
Members of Parliament.
1995 NSW Passenger Transport Act 1995 Amendments prohibited smoking on buses, ferries, taxis, and some private hire vehicles.
1997 NSW Passive Smoking Taskforce 
recommendations released
Taskforce convened by the NSW government consisted of NSW Department of Health 
bureaucrats, health advocacy groups, academics, and hospitality association 
representatives from restaurants, clubs and hotels.
The taskforce recommended that the government ban smoking in all public places, 
including restaurants, bars and clubs. The only dissenting member was the AHA.
NSW Smoking Regulation Act 1997 passed The Act banned smoking in public places, but was virtually ineffective because bans were 
not to be implemented until five years after the Department of Health had established 
ventilation air quality standards.
1999 NSW Rail Safety Regulation 1999 Smoking banned on any NSW train or covered train platform.
2000 NSW Smokefree Environment Act 2000 passed The Act banned smoking in enclosed public spaces, including restaurants and the dining 
areas of pubs and clubs. Although the original Bill included bars and clubs, these venues 
were exempt from the final act.
When passed, the NSW Smokefree Environment Act was the most comprehensive SHS 
state law in Australia.
2001 Sharp v Port Kembla Hotel & RSL Club law suit 
verdict
A non-smoking bar attendant who developed throat cancer after 11 years of 
employment at a club was awarded $500,000 damages
2003 "Share the Air" voluntary agreement brokered 
with NSW club, pubs and hotels and NSW 
government
A Government and industry working group agreed that pubs and clubs will provide at 
least one smokefree bar and a 1.5 m no-smoking zone around bar areas. The NSW 
government promises to introduce formal legislation within a year.
2004 NSW Smokefree Environment Amendment Act 
2004 passed
All enclosed areas of hotels, clubs and nightclubs that are open to the general public 
must be completely non-smoking by July 2007, as well as all areas of the Sydney casino, 
with the exception of private gaming rooms.
2005 First phase of NSW Smokefree Environment 
Amendment Act 2004 came into effect January 3, 
2005
This phase replaced and formally legislated the voluntary "Share the Air" agreement.
If a venue has:
• More than one bar, then one bar should be non-smoking.
• More than one of the same type of gambling area, then one of these should be non-
smoking.
• More than one recreational room that offers the same game or activity as another, 
then one of these should be non-smoking.
Smoking is banned in all dining areas and at all counter and bar service areas.
Second phase of NSW Smokefree Environment 
Amendment Act 2004 came into effect July 4, 
2005
In a multi-room venue smoking allowed in a maximum of one room. The smoking room 
must not exceed 25% of the total combined area of the venue.
If a venue consists of a single room, then smoking permitted in up to 25% of that area.
2006 NSW Smokefree Environment Amendment Act 
2006 passed
The government amended the 2004 Act to adopt a definition of an "enclosed space" that 
will allow smoking in areas that are up to 75% enclosed in hotels, clubs and nightclubs. 
The Act is to be implemented in July 2007.Page 3 of 12
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becomes ever more routine, public support for smoking
bans to be extended to bars also increases[20]. A large
body of research has also accumulated showing either
positive or negligible economic impacts on bar earnings
following bans [21].
Notwithstanding this accumulating evidence, interest
groups seeking to prevent and delay the introduction of
smokefree bars have often succeeded in their objectives
[22-27]. In Australia, the tobacco industry has a long his-
tory of attempting to discredit studies showing the harms
of SHS [28] or circumvent smoking bans [29]. The Austral-
ian Hotels Association (AHA) and Clubs NSW have now
replaced the tobacco industry as the dominant public
voice opposing smoking bans in Australia [2]. Having
acknowledged direct support from the tobacco industry,
the AHA's opposition to bans is a classic example of the
tobacco industry's "third party strategy" in action [30].
This paper examines the factors that key stakeholders in
NSW believe characterise the policy development process
of SHS legislation, and provides suggestions of what strat-
egies might best accelerate the current political inertia of
incrementally addressing the issue of smoking in bars and
clubs.
Methods
Data were gathered from interviews with key stakeholders
who played a central role in or could provide insight into
the development of various SHS restrictions in NSW over
the past two decades. A total of 29 key individuals or
organisations were invited to participate in this study,
resulting in 21 participants. In-depth semi-structured
interviews were conducted between February and April
2003 and each lasted between 1–1.5 hours. Participants
included a cross-section of current and former politicians
(6), political advisors (2), current and former senior
health bureaucrats (5), tobacco control advocates (6), and
catering industry (1) and labour union (1) representa-
tives. Participants have been classified by their current or
most recent affiliation and have been de-identified for
confidentiality reasons.
Interviewees were asked to comment on their role in the
development or delaying of SHS legislation in NSW, to
reflect on the dynamics surrounding the debates and out-
comes of legislative attempts and to provide suggestions
about what they believed might progress comprehensive
SHS legislation on the political agenda today. All partici-
pants were given the opportunity to review and approve
the transcripts from the interviews. De-identified tran-
scripts are available upon request from the first author.
The first author conducted a primary content analysis of
the interviews [31]. The second author read the transcripts
and discussed the coding and themes with the first author
to reach consensus. The authors also searched media arti-
cles, press releases, NSW Parliamentary Hansard, journal
articles and personal archives. These documents provided
context, history and background to SHS legislative
attempts in NSW, corroborated interviewees' comments
and gave voice to individuals or groups who did not par-
ticipate in this study. Quotations were selected as repre-
sentative of themes that emerged in the process of
analysis. This study was approved by the University of
Sydney Human Ethics Research Committee.
Results
Inevitability and incremental advances
"I think most analysts would see that it's almost inevitable that
it will finally happen, but the intriguing question is, what are
the forces that are making it happen so slowly?" [health advo-
cate]
Interestingly, despite suggestions that SHS was "relatively
unimportant" [bureaucrat] and had "never been a big
issue" [politician] on any government's political agenda,
a political advisor reflected that there were few issues that
sparked as much political, media and community interest
as the debate over smoking. Nearly every participant
agreed that the "writing is on the wall" [political advisor]
for bars and clubs to go smokefree. However, the consen-
sus among supporters of smokefree legislation was that
"nobody [in government] is prepared to take the plunge"
[union representative], for the reasons outlined below.
Tobacco control supporters recognized that "as with a lot
of progress in tobacco control, it rarely happens suddenly;
in fact, it never happens suddenly" [advocate], and
acknowledged that incremental changes were important
first steps in the early days of SHS advocacy. However,
with bar and club workers remaining exposed to SHS,
advocates were frustrated that "the timeframe that [the
government] outline [s] is less ambitious than any of us
ever contemplated back in 2000. We thought that maybe
it would be a few years at most" [advocate].
A ministerial advisor acknowledged advocates' frustra-
tion, but explained that other government priorities make
"things move more slowly than you'd like them to."
Another advisor admitted that it was no longer a question
of if smoking should be banned in pubs and clubs via leg-
islation, but rather a question of when and how the govern-
ment would act. However, this advisor suggested that,
while it was clear that removing smoke from workplaces
was the right health decision, SHS was a politically chal-
lenging issue that would not be fixed quickly. Instead, pol-
iticians and advisors indicated that incremental advancesPage 4 of 12
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only way government can work" [political advisor]
because of the government's need to take into account a
variety of stakeholders. These interviewees also suggested
that incremental change is "not unreasonable" [politi-
cian] because it "allows the community to go with you"
[politician].
Because of the government's desire to balance various
issues and stakeholders, politicians and advisors sug-
gested that health advocates who are open to compromise
and incremental progress will more likely be heard and
received by the government. However, advocates felt chal-
lenged by this position because "if you just sit back and
are nice to politicians all the time, does that really get you
anywhere?...Somehow you've got to tell them that 'more
needs to be done and that hasn't gone far enough"' [advo-
cate] in protecting the public from SHS.
Advocates cautioned that incremental steps can slow
progress towards comprehensive bans and contribute to
the sense that an issue has been taken care of and, as a
result, take some pressure off politicians to act more
strongly. For example, several informants felt that com-
promises for smoke-free zones (such as no smoking
within one metre of the drink service area) in bars and
clubs were ways for the government to deal with SHS
"politically" rather than "fundamentally" [advocate], by
assuaging these industries but compromising health
standards.
Competition for the agenda with immediate issues
"I think that deep down they know it's the right thing to do, but
that there are more immediate concerns, and I think that prob-
ably is what weighs more heavily on their minds." [advocate]
When attempting to explain the reasons why SHS legisla-
tion has failed to attract political urgency, most inform-
ants agreed that acute health issues, such as hospital bed
shortages, unavoidably take precedence on the political
agenda. Since political terms are only four years long,
some bureaucrats suggested there is not much political
investment in preventive health measures, such as smok-
ing restrictions, because health improvements may not be
evident for many years. A former health minister
explained that "you cannot escape today by focusing on
tomorrow." While championing tobacco control "was
seen to be providing leadership and bringing some vision
to the portfolio, from the negative view, it could be seen
as taking time away from... [more] pressing issues."
Advocates proposed that one difficulty in raising the pro-
file of SHS has been that "the idea of chronic exposure...
is a difficult concept for people to take on board" [advo-
cate]. While interviewees across the political spectrum
acknowledged that the scientific evidence shows SHS is a
health risk, tobacco control proponents indicated that
they must still battle "an underlying sense of disbelief that
[SHS] couldn't be as dangerous as everyone is saying"
[advocate]. Because people do not often immediately
become ill from SHS, advocates have found the dangers of
SHS "a very difficult story to sell" [advocate] to both the
public and politicians. Another advocate suggested that
smoking was banned in workplaces and airplanes because
people viewed involuntary exposure in a small environ-
ment as unacceptable; however, there is a sense that peo-
ple choose to go to bars and, thus, are voluntarily
exposed.
Issue wear-out and sense that tobacco control has been 
"done"
"To use a transport analogy, it's a bit like putting a road
through the mountains, and now we're down to curbing and
guttering the highway. But putting the road through is the
important thing." [politician]
Interviewees across the political spectrum also agreed that
issue wear-out was inhibiting the attention given to SHS
as a relevant and urgent issue. One advocate suggested
that the biggest threat to advocates' success of achieving
smoking bans in pubs and clubs was "a strong sense...that
tobacco has been 'done"' by both members of the political
and public health communities. Most informants indi-
cated that politicians probably feel that they have already
addressed the issue adequately, since most workers are
now protected, and that they are content that "there are a
few things to tidy up, but there are more important issues
to worry about at the moment" [politician].
Tobacco control advocates also commented that issue
wear-out has made it difficult to be heard by politicians or
political advisors because the arguments and stakeholders
surrounding the issue on both sides have remained the
same. One advocate proposed that "unless you've got
something new to say, [politicians] are not that inter-
ested." However, the challenge recognised by many inter-
viewees, regardless of their affiliation, was that there was
not much new to say on either side of the argument:
health advocates cite the health evidence showing the
harms of SHS, the economic studies from other jurisdic-
tions showing that businesses are not harmed by bans and
increasing public support, whereas the industry has
attempted to keep SHS issues framed around economic
losses and ideological arguments[2].
Power of industry opposition
"I just think there was a lot of political lack of will because the
tobacco industry was still very active in its misinformation cam-
paign, [and] that the hotels and others just kept saying 'Look,
we'll go broke'." [advocate]Page 5 of 12
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industry has played a significant role in the outcome of
SHS legislation. Supporters of workplace smoking bans,
including a representative from a restaurant industry asso-
ciation, expressed frustration with the level of influence
that pubs and clubs have been able to wield in policy
negotiations. These informants proposed that clubs and
hotels have successfully avoided complete bans in their
venues because they are "highly regarded" [politician]
organisations that are "fairly important in the Australian
context" [union representative]. Many important local
identities tend to be hotel or club owners or associates and
"that web of influence can be very important to politi-
cians" [advocate]. A bureaucrat noted that, because of this
influence, "there is a deeply entrenched view in govern-
ment that there are no wins, and a lot of potential to lose,
by tackling the bar situation."
Nearly all participants, including many of the politicians
interviewed, reported their belief that the bar and club
industries' political power was a reflection of financial
donations to political parties. In contrast, the two political
advisors were adamant that political donations played
"zero" or "less of a role" than some advocates imagined.
Instead, these political advisors suggested that the indus-
tries' influence with government is via the currency of job
loss arguments – however spurious – because "if you
make decisions that cost jobs, that's a very serious political
issue" [political advisor].
Beyond these reasons, interviewees also suggested that the
hotel and club industries have successfully promoted a
pervasive sense in the community and among influential
politicians that bars are somehow inherently "different"
to other workplaces. Informants noted that bars are seen
as a reasonable "last bastion" of smoking by many people,
and that smoking in bars is "somehow emblematic of
some form of Australian life that needed to be protected"
[advocate]. Health bureaucrats, discouraged that their
health-based policy advice is often ignored by politicians,
reported that that because of industry lobbying the gov-
ernment was often more interested in a "comfort stand-
ard" [bureaucrat], such as ventilation systems and no-
smoking zones that have been scientifically shown to be
ineffective in reducing the health risk of tobacco smoke
[32], rather than a comprehensive SHS ban.
Evidence is outweighed by economic, ideological and 
anecdotal arguments
"It's not that they're not persuaded by the evidence, it's just that
those other forces outweigh what they're trying to do." [bureau-
crat]
Although all interviewees recognised SHS as a health risk,
and most noted that governments would not act without
a scientific and economic evidence base, they held differ-
ent views regarding the extent to which this evidence can
influence political decisions. Advocates stressed that evi-
dence is "the foundation of your advocacy" [advocate].
However, politicians and political advisors indicated that
evidence has limited power in governmental delibera-
tions and noted that governments "can't make decisions
based on the science alone" [advisor]. One political advi-
sor went as far to say that "evidence" presented by any lob-
byist is often viewed with circumspection because
lobbyists tend to "spin" findings to suit their position.
Indeed, as suggested by some interviewees, if evidence
were the only factor in political decisions, the NSW gov-
ernment would not have supported the partial restrictions
supported by industry groups or have delayed compre-
hensive legislation for decades. Several interviewees pro-
posed that the value of economic studies and scientific
reports supporting smoking bans is diminished in politi-
cal debates when countered by anecdotal economic and
job loss arguments. A political advisor commented that it
was one thing to talk to an industry lobbyist about pro-
jected economic losses, but it was "a very different thing
to talk about a family member who has his entire business
attached to a pub." A politician suggested that anecdotes
and "folklore" stories of economic ruin have always car-
ried more weight in political conversations than scientific
studies and other forms of independent evidence. Inter-
viewees also indicated that international evidence does
not hold as much weight in political decision-making, as
opponents can counter that Australia is "different," and
highlighted the need for more Australian-specific studies
to be conducted.
The gambling factor
Participants also described how in recent years, the club
and pub industries have framed their arguments around
the threatened loss of gambling profit if smoking were
banned in clubs and pubs (which have gaming
machines), as gamblers tend often to be heavy smokers.
Because of the "mutually beneficial income" [advocate]
both the government and clubs get from gaming, some
interviewees suggested that emphasising possible gam-
bling profit loss might be "a convenient [argument] to dis-
tract attention away from the real issue – protecting
people's health" [bureaucrat]. Several interviewees sug-
gested that a problem facing advocates today is that there
are no solid independent local studies relating to the
impact of smoking bans specifically on gambling reve-
nues in Australia. For example, because hotel-based gam-
bling is not legal or widespread in most international
jurisdictions that have already banned smoking in bars
and clubs [33], the economic studies on which advocates
have relied have never included the impact of smoking
ban on gambling venues in pubs or hotels. OppositionPage 6 of 12
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"difference" and have argued that foreign studies of public
support and positive economic impact are therefore irrel-
evant.
What does the public believe?
"There isn't a visible constituency...that [resonates] with politi-
cians, that gives them the impression, the belief, that there are
real numbers attached to this issue for them electorally." [advo-
cate]
Nearly all interviewees agreed that public opinion is an
influential factor in political decisions; however, what was
considered to constitute evidence of public opinion dif-
fered between interviewees. Supporters of smoking bans
have "always been heartened by the results of public opin-
ion polls" [advocate] that show majority popular support
for bans, and expressed frustration that these appeared to
have little impact on politicians. In contrast, politicians
and advisors explained that political assessment of public
sentiment is often "more of a gut feeling" [advisor]. One
advisor considered that people who go to pubs and clubs
in rural areas are a different constituency than in the city,
and suggested that this electorate was not ready for smok-
ing bans.
Despite documented public support for smoking bans,
interviewees noted that policymakers appear to believe
that those in favour of bans are not as passionate about
their preferences as those opposed to bans, and that the
intensity of the public's support with regard to bans in
pubs and clubs remains in doubt. One advocate suggested
that the only times politicians hear of smoking bans are
from the "usual suspects": the same predictable handful
of tobacco control advocates. Several informants reported
their belief that the public seldom vocalizes its support of
bans to parliamentary representatives. In the face of
industry lobbying, an advocate suggested that if politi-
cians believe that smoking bans are not a pressing issue
for their constituents, they think "'Why should we incur
all this angst from the AHA?"'
Interestingly, despite smokefree venues becoming the
norm and politicians claiming that smoking bans are not
an important issue for their constituents, informants inti-
mated that policymakers still fear that there could be
political "backlash" from select segments of the popula-
tion. Some Labor Party members indicated that their
members have a strong sense of "camaraderie with blokes
in this country" [politician] who want to smoke in their
"traditional" local pub, and that the government believes
rural constituents are less likely to be supportive of smok-
ing bans than city-dwellers [political advisor].
While a former health minister acknowledged that in
hindsight there was no political fallout from banning
smoking in workplaces and restaurants, he indicated that
past reluctance on the part of both major parties to pass
legislation in the early- and mid-1990s was due in large
part to its sense that "there was political concern and fear
that there could be a voter backlash in the event of the
restriction of smoking" because many people smoked.
However, previous concerns of voter-backlash regarding
workplaces, public transport, and restaurants have proven
to be unfounded with the public supporting the restric-
tions, as evidenced by high compliance rates and increas-
ing public support [13,20,34].
What will overcome the inertia of incrementalism?
"The law of inertia, isn't that what's going on? You need some-
thing more powerful in order to change the direction. The iner-
tia right now is to do nothing." [union representative]
Similar to analysis of other tobacco control policy
attempts [35-38], nearly all informants in this study
believed that the challenge rests with advocates in NSW to
"find a pathway...to make it politically advantageous"
[advocate] for politicians to take action. Advocates and
bureaucrats both acknowledged that the Health Depart-
ment representatives had "laid everything on the
table...[but] they can't influence the political process"
[advocate] to progress SHS on the political agenda. Simi-
larly, while minor party politicians and independent
Members of Parliament had successfully pushed SHS onto
the political agenda in the past by introducing bills and
debate in Parliament, there was general agreement that
only a bill introduced by the government would be
accepted at this stage.
Advocates indicated that "the single most important
thing... [is] that we remain committed and persistent"
[advocate]. A political advisor agreed and stressed that
although advocates may feel like they are "knocking their
heads against a brick wall," they should "keep knocking
because someone's [eventually] going to let you in."
Although no participant was able to conclusively state
what they believed would be the "smoking gun" [union
representative] that would overcome the inertia of incre-
mental compromises in regards to pubs and clubs, they
had a variety of suggestions of what tactics advocates
should take to win the final endgame.
Keep the issue focused on workers' rights and health to 
discredit industry arguments
Tobacco control supporters stressed the importance of
keeping the issue of smoking bans centred on the concept
of workers' rights and health protection. They suggested
that the best way to counter the promotion of the "Aus-Page 7 of 12
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go together, is to frame smoking bans around the idea that
"there is something fundamentally un-Australian about
exposing workers to risks that we protect other workers
from in every other situation" [advocate]. By highlighting
SHS as a health inequity and making "the connection
between the unpleasant experience" and the proven dan-
ger of SHS resonate with both the public and politicians
[advocate], advocates may better influence community
support and counter industry arguments about revenue
loss [38,39].
Mobilize a visible constituency
Most interviewees commented that one of the most pow-
erful forces that would convince politicians to finally act
would be the mobilization of a visible and diverse constit-
uency demanding smoking bans in pubs and clubs. How-
ever, tobacco control supporters were sceptical about their
ability to get the public impassioned about the issue
because "we've reached a stalemate where places the
empowered middle classes go are largely smokefree" [pol-
itician]. A union representative cautioned that "we're not
going to necessarily going to get the public's perception to
move all that much more than it already is," because, "to
the extent to which you remove the problem for the
majority," there are fewer people to view the issue as a
problem.
Use the media strategically
Nearly every participant commented that "the media have
enormous power" [politician] in influencing both the
public and political views about SHS. Media were seen as
the "predominant" vehicle to educate the public [advo-
cate], to "push politicians' buttons" [bureaucrat], and to
contribute to changing social norms and expectations
regarding the acceptability of passive smoking. Advocates
and other tobacco control supporters indicated that they
needed to strategically utilize the media by being available
for public comment, calling into talk-back radio pro-
grams, writing letters to the editor, capitalizing on new
evidence or events, and putting forward a vocal tobacco
control position to counter-balance industry comments.
Partnerships with other groups
Another strategy suggested by some informants to
increase health advocates' profile with the public and gain
more access to inside policy discussions, was partnerships
with organisations, such as the labour unions, which the
government sees as an important constituency. Advocates
and the labour union representative noted that the forma-
tion of the "Smokefree '03" (now the "Smokefree Aus-
tralia") campaign, comprising health charities, health
advocacy groups and labour unions, broadened advo-
cates' advocacy opportunities and access to politicians.
For example, one advocate described how different organ-
izations and individuals can play complimentary "good
cop/bad cop" roles, with one organisation compliment-
ing the government on its progress, and another taking a
harder, critical stance in the media. Although some advo-
cates cautioned that it can be challenging to present a
united front or find agreement on issues, they believed a
more cohesive strategy and acknowledgement of diverse
allies could assist in advancing SHS on the political
agenda.
Demonstrations and grassroots campaigns
Interviewees described demonstrations and grassroots
campaigns as another potentially influential strategy to
put external pressure on the government. However, many
participants said that the success of such strategies was
dependent on the groups and individuals participating in
the campaign, highlighting the importance of recognising
each advocacy group's strengths and weaknesses in con-
tributing to the SHS campaign. For example, some inter-
viewees described how a hospitality labour union had
effectively utilized grassroots lobbying to promote smoke-
free places – and had succeeded in influencing the Health
Minister to include a ban on smoking at casino tables as
part of the Smokefree Environment Act 2000. In contrast,
while a community non-smokers advocacy group repre-
sentative held the view that its rallies and letter-writing
campaigns had given visibility to SHS issues, several other
advocates cautioned that the group is perceived as "kill-
joys" [advocate] that lack credibility with policymakers
and the community.
More court cases needed
"If you get a couple of [litigation] cases where major pubs or
clubs go down...you'll have the government...falling over them-
selves to introduce urgent legislation if necessary in Parlia-
ment." [politician]
Additional cases of litigation were another frequent sug-
gestion about what would increase momentum on pas-
sive smoking legislation. Most participants said that
previous court cases [40] had stimulated public debate,
provided advocates with opportunity to increase media
advocacy and allowed for tobacco control lobbying to be
more favourably received by some politicians. Fear of liti-
gation was viewed as a reason more clubs and pubs have
voluntarily gone smoke-free [union representative], and
the reason why the government went ahead with earlier
SHS legislation [political advisor] [41].
The power of litigation to influence policy outcomes is
supported by tobacco industry documents that show that
the tobacco industry and its allies perceived early court
cases such as major setbacks [28]. However, one advocate
commented that at this stage court cases may not be "as
threatening as they used to." For example, the most recentPage 8 of 12
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damages to a non-smoking bar attendant who had devel-
oped throat cancer [42], did not "achieve the outcomes we
were all hoping for" [advocate]. Although the case estab-
lished a legal precedent and prompted supportive media
articles that bars and clubs can be responsible for work-
place-caused tobacco-related disease, it did not result in
additional political action.
Competition with other states
Many bureaucrats and politicians noted that NSW prides
itself on leading other Australian states in government ini-
tiatives, and suggested that "one-upmanship" [bureau-
crat] with other states might provide the stimulus for the
NSW government to move faster. One politician noted
that Australian states are like "dominos" and when one
state takes the first step, the others will likely follow
shortly after. For example, all Australian states followed
the lead of the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and then
NSW by banning smoking in restaurants [43], and others
have subsequently introduced laws to varying levels of
comprehensiveness [44].
Find champions in government
"You've either got to have a lot of constituents knocking on the
door saying I want something done, or you've got to have a pol-
itician with a fire in the belly who takes this problem and says
'We bloody need to deal with it."' [politician]
In addition to putting external pressure on policymakers
through the outside advocacy strategies described above,
interviewees suggested that advocates must find a cham-
pion in government and convince him or her that sup-
porting smoking bans is a good political decision. In the
past, legislative attempts have only been successful when
championed by a senior government politician. Several
interviewees suggested that if the Premier or another high
ranking politician had the courage to stand up to critics
and back the issue, legislation to ban smoking in pubs and
clubs could happen without much resistance.
Discussion
In the past 20 years, the tobacco control movement in
NSW has advocated successfully for considerable SHS leg-
islation and regulation, and non-smoking indoor areas
are now the public norm, enjoying wide support
[13,20,34]. Yet the bar, club and casino industries con-
tinue to avoid total bans in their environments. In the
three years since the interviews for this study were con-
ducted, an agreement for comprehensive SHS legislation
that includes bars has yet to be reached in NSW. Once
again, the government has made concessions to industry,
this time in the form of a definition of "enclosed spaces"
that will allow smoking in areas that are substantially
enclosed. Other Australian states (Tasmania and Queens-
land), Ireland, Norway, New Zealand, England and Scot-
land and several state governments in the USA and
Canada have either implemented total indoor smoking
bans, or legislated for their introduction.
The factors inhibiting the adoption of comprehensive
restrictions, as described in this study, appear not to have
dissipated. Interviewees' comments show that SHS restric-
tions in NSW have been contested and never been defined
solely as being about achieving health outcomes, but have
been delayed by several broad factors including: the con-
tinued influence of industry groups that have successfully
opposed regulation; issue wear-out; and political percep-
tions that there is not a salient constituency demanding
smoking be banned in bars and clubs.
Industry influence
A major challenge for proponents of SHS regulation, as
with most tobacco control endeavours, lies in the public
benefits of regulation being perceived as diffuse, while the
potential costs of regulation are concentrated on a vocal
single interest group – the clubs and hotel industry [45].
In September 2004, in anticipation of the announcement
that NSW would end smoking in pubs, the AHA sent its
members a fax claiming their businesses would be
"destroyed", that there would be "20% job loss" and that
"61% of bars in Dublin will not survive much longer"
[46]. despite reports from Norway, New Zealand and New
York showing that the recent adoption of bans in these
venues had minimal impact on business [47-49].
Although economic and ideological arguments against
SHS legislation would appear to be both wrong and out-
dated, industry groups have succeeded in promoting a
politically potent combination of these to the heart of
NSW politics.
Issue wear-out
Advocates operating in incrementalist political environ-
ments face the challenge that they may achieve only
achieve a portion of their goals before their issue is "worn-
out" and perceived to be "done" by politicians. Conso-
nant with Nielsen's [39] observation of tobacco control in
the United States, windows of opportunity [50] for creat-
ing tobacco control legislation may be closing in Australia
as well. Issue wear-out may explain why other more
immediate political concerns continually take precedence
over SHS on the political agenda, why the public does not
appear impassioned about the issue, and why SHS does
not appear to politicians as a politically urgent problem
that must be addressed.
No visible constituency
Although strong and unambiguous public opinion can be
a powerful motivator to persuade government to act
[37,38,51], interviewees did not believe that politiciansPage 9 of 12
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that often characterises other health issues which receive
urgent political attention. As long as politicians do not
perceive that a significant number of their constituents
support smokefree laws as a significant problem that
needs urgent attention, they will not feel the need to
progress towards complete bans any faster [50,52-54].
As advocates suggested, because most politicians often
only hear from "usual suspects" on this issue, advocates
would be advised to mobilize other constituencies to
vocalize support of smoking bans in bars and clubs. These
new voices might include constituents in marginal politi-
cal seats, bar workers, doctors, and other health workers,
whose voices might resonate with politicians and provide
personal stories to counter the anecdotes about economic
ruin presented by opposition groups. If advocates are able
to demonstrate overwhelming public support that spans
the spectrum of constituents, politicians and their advi-
sors will have to publicly defend why they continue to
refuse to ban smoking in all workplaces, and will be less
able to dismiss public opinion surveys as unrepresentative
of the NSW population.
Lessons for the endgame
Although advocates believed that past advancements
towards smokefree areas were accomplished primarily
through their groundwork strategies that would eventu-
ally be realised in the form of policies and laws, the sup-
port of a key legislator [38] was imperative in putting SHS
on the political agenda both in 2000 (with restaurants
and other public places) and in 2004 (with the latest in
bars and clubs). No informant interviewed claimed to
know anything precise about what influenced the Pre-
mier's apparently personal decision to take leadership on
the issue and ban smoking in restaurants in 2000, allud-
ing to his decision as a more or less inevitable response to
the growing anti-smoking social environment in which he
felt politically comfortable to act. Similarly, the entrance
into politics of another champion in 2004 in the form of
the newly appointed Minister for Cancer was undoubt-
edly critical to pushing bans in bars and clubs onto the
political agenda [55,56]. As noted, the resulting legisla-
tion has been compromised in the face of industry lobby-
ing, but the new law that will be implemented in July
2007 will see all fully enclosed rooms smokefree –
another increment toward the final comprehensive total
indoor smoking ban.
With the NSW government continuing to make conces-
sions to industry demands, the strategies outlined by the
participants in this study still have relevance to tobacco
control advocates faced with similar incremental
approaches. As with other studies, it appears that advo-
cates in NSW have been the most successful when they uti-
lize strategies that place outside pressure on policymakers,
rather than trying to lobby from inside the political
sphere, in which the industry excels [36,37,57].
In the past years, local advocates have capitalized on some
of the tactics described in this study. An example was a
2005 media campaign in which an Irish bar patron mocks
the NSW government for believing its residents are not
ready for comprehensive bans when the Irish have been
able to do it. This appropriated Australia's concern to not
"lag behind" other countries [58]. By continuing to utilize
their partnerships with groups that have visibility with the
government and working on advancing smoking bans
through the use of outside strategies – particularly media
advocacy and the mobilization of additional voices –
advocates can continue to create visible demand for
smoking bans in bars and clubs and hold politicians
accountable for the inequity of their exceptionalist policy
of protecting all workers other than bar staff.
Conclusion
Governments in the end stage of policy controls of SHS
are often attracted to continuing drawn out incremental
policy advances rather than risk confrontation with hospi-
tality and tobacco interests. Advocates concerned to
shorten the duration of this endgame must continue to
insist that governments address the issue fundamentally
by securing protection for all workers from SHS, rather
than politically conceding to industry demands. Efforts
are needed to both broaden and amplify community
voices calling on governments to finish the job. Publicity
to the growing number of state and national governments
that have successfully implemented total bans over the
past decade, as well as to continued public support, is
likely to make incrementalism an increasingly unattrac-
tive political option.
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